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Despite the prevalence of both competitive forces and patterns of collaboration within 
academic communities, studies on research productivity generally treat universities as 
independent entities. By exploring the research productivity of all academic economists 
employed at 81 universities and 17 economic research institutes in Austria, Germany, and 
German-speaking Switzerland, this study finds that a research unit’s productivity 
negatively depends on that of neighboring research units weighted by inverse distances. 
This significant and exemplary robust negative relationship is compatible with the notion 
of competition for priority of discovery among individual researchers and the universities 
that employ them, and with the notion that the willingness to relocate decreases with 
distance. In addition, the empirical results support the hypotheses that collaboration and 
the existence of economies of scale increase research productivity.  
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1. Introduction 
In a series of articles beginning in the late 1950s, the sociologist Robert K. Merton 
convincingly delineated the behavior of scientists. According to Merton (e.g., 1973), 
scientists compete to establish the priority of their discovery by being first to 
communicate an advance in knowledge in a scientific journal. The basic goal of such 
behavior is to acquire scientific recognition from the scientific community at large, as 
also detailed by Collins (1998) from a historical perspective and Stephan (1996) from an 
economic perspective.  
Studies after Merton (1973) have questioned the hypothesis that scientific 
recognition is the sole motivation and have tried to give more meaning to the reward 
system provided by scientific fields. According to Hagstrom (1975), researchers not only 
produce knowledge to gain esteem but also aim to speed up their own personal 
advancement. Researchers offer their output as a gift (i.e., free of charge) to the entire 
community, with the purpose of attracting counter gifts. Bourdieu (1975) instead 
proposes that scientists behave as capitalists who work to place their scientific output at 
the right time in the right place in the scientific field, by investing in the most profitable 
subjects and methods in relation to demand. 
 Overviews published by Merton (1973), Stephan (1996), and Vinck (2010) 
indicate that the reward system can take multiple forms. It may grant access to 
employment, in the form of appointments as researcher, lecturer, or professor, to research 
subsidies, consulting fees or grants, but also to capital goods as equipment, software, or 
data.  Rewards can also take the form of eponymy, such as when the scientist’s name is 
attached to a discovery or scientific prizes (e.g., the Nobel Prize), or the number of 
citations received on an article, invitations to speak at conferences, or easier acceptance 
of new work for publication, especially in prestigious journals. This part of reward is 
alternatively referred as prestige, renown, credit, authority, or visibility.  
 Despite differences in emphasis, all these overview studies assume scientists are 
competitors and that the key to more or higher rewards is the production of more articles 
in higher-quality journals. Maske et al. (2003) go so far as to presume that a researcher's 
utility function depends on only one argument: total number of articles in refereed 
journals. A similar principle applies to universities or research institutes where the 
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scientists hold academic positions (Stephan, 1996; Vinck, 2010). To obtain funds, they 
must demonstrate their societal relevance to backers, such as by showing that they 
published a lot of research. For these reasons, the research productivity of individual 
scientists and that of the universities and research institutes in which they are employed 
have become primary topics of economic inquiry, across three main directions. 
First, efforts focused on ranking research institutions, which eventually have 
expanded to rankings of individual researchers. One of the most comprehensive European 
studies is by Combes and Linnemer (2003), who rank approximately 600 economic 
research centers using quality-adjusted measures of publication activities. Their U.S. 
counterparts are Dusansky and Vernon (1998), who review and compare several rankings 
of top economic departments. The primary purpose of these studies is to provide “near-
objective” information about the comparative quality of research in a world in which 
academic publications have reached a great deal of variety. These studies consistently 
find that research productivity is highly skewed, such that most articles are written by a 
limited number of scientists, employed by major universities located in a few countries 
(for detailed figures, see Frenken et al., 2009; Vinck, 2010). 
 Second, researchers have tried to identify the drivers of research productivity. 
Research productivity can be measured and explained at the individual level, university 
level, or even the level of a particular area, such as nations. To explain research 
productivity at the individual level, most studies apply human capital models, in which 
lifecycle variables such as gender, age, experience, and academic position are significant. 
According to Stephan (1996), the explanatory power of these lifecycle models remains 
rather low though, because they cannot explain why research productivity among 
scientists is so skewed. Fabel et al. (2008) and Rauber and Ursprung (2008b) 
investigating publication data related to German economic and business economic 
researchers confirm this claim and indicate R-square values not greater than 0.1 at the 
individual level, and 0.05 at the level of departments. 
 Other studies in this strand additionally concentrate on the relationship between 
research output and location characteristics. Bonaccorsi and Daraio (2005) investigate the 
impact of size and agglomeration effects on institutional productivity, using data about 
non-university research institutions that belong to the Italian National Research Council 
 4 
and France’s INSERM1. They find weak evidence in favor of agglomeration effects in 
France only and no evidence of economies of scale. They rationalize this result claiming 
that scientific excellence creates its own agglomeration effects rather than that 
agglomeration effects make researchers more productive. Carvalho and Batty (2006) test 
whether physical location matters to research output in the U.S. computer science field. 
They conclude that advantages stem from “good” locations, when they control for 
population and research funding. Kim et al. (2009) investigate research productivity for 
economics and finance faculty at the top 25 U.S. universities for the period 1970–2001. 
Those top universities actually appear to have lost their ability to boost the productivity 
of their researchers during this period, because Internet and the concomitant decline in 
communication costs have given faculty even in remote places access to the latest 
developments. Nevertheless the top departments enjoy the highest average productivity, 
because they are still able to attract and retain the most productive researchers; top 
researchers thus agglomerate in institutions with prestigious undergraduate programs and 
strong research reputations. 
 Third, literature has tried to identify the mechanisms for scholarly collaboration. 
The probability that two researchers work together on a project depends on the costs, 
which increase as function of geographical distance, and the benefits, which increase if 
both researchers are employed at an elite university (Frenken et al., 2009; Hoekman et al., 
2009). Through collaboration a scientist can diversify his or her research portfolio, which 
minimizes the risk that time invested in research and writing goes to waste if the papers 
are not accepted for publication. Another factor is quality. Scientists who collaborate may 
be more productive than individual investigators, because they tend to produce better 
science if they share knowledge and learn from one another (Ursprung and Zimmer, 
2007). In the most recent study, Bosquet and Combes (2013) demonstrate that academic 
economists who have published more articles and who have had more different co-
authors reach a higher average quality of publications using exhaustive dataset of French 
economists. In addition, unknown, young researchers may find it difficult to get their 
contributions published, so they seek recognized scientists to work with them and 
                                                 
 
1
 Institut national de la santé et de la recherche médicale. 
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coauthor their articles. The settled scientists in turn may be willing to advise and assist 
the young scientists due to the so-called Matthew effect (coined by Robert K. Merton): 
When two researchers coauthor an article, readers tend to notice only the most eminent 
author and gradually forget the other, regardless of their actual levels of contribution to 
the work. In other cases, colleagues receive coauthorship status as a reward for sharing 
access to data, software, or equipment. Laband and Tollison (2000), in their examination 
of the increase of coauthorship incidence, cite the capital intensity of research as the main 
rationale for biology and the higher probability of publication as the reason in economic 
fields.  
 Frenken et al. (2009) find that most collaborations are local or domestic rather 
than international. One explanation posed for such cooperation at the local level refers to 
agglomeration effects, such as economies of scale. According to Bonaccorsi and Daraio 
(2005), economies of scale are synonymous with critical mass. There exists a minimum 
efficient scale for the administrative costs of universities. Moreover, meaningful output 
requires the combination and coordination of many scientists from different fields who 
can provide competencies in both the substantive field and variety of complementary 
areas. Size also may have benefits in terms of organizational support, including direct 
resources employed in scientific production such as assistants or equipment, shared 
resources such as libraries and facilities, and indirect resources such as competent 
colleagues. 
 Despite their contributions though, all three lines of research overlook Merton's 
(1973) basic notion that the primary goal of scientists is to establish priority of discovery, 
because there is little value in being second or third. If they cannot achieve this goal by 
publishing journal articles individually, scholarly cooperation may be beneficial, even if 
scientists remain competitors who strive to produce objective knowledge first to acquire 
esteem benefits. In this study, we aim to verify empirically Merton's basic notion that 
universities and scientists are competitors. For this purpose, we apply spatial econometric 
techniques with geo-referenced research output data for economic departments of 
universities or economic research institutes. Although empirical literature on research 
productivity is growing, this article presents one of the first studies to test for competition 
and apply these advanced techniques.  
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 Spatial econometrics refers to a subfield in econometrics that analyzes cross-
sectional or longitudinal data in which the interaction among units relates to location and 
distance variables (Anselin, 1988; LeSage and Pace, 2009). According to Anselin (2010), 
this field has reached a stage of maturity through general acceptance of spatial econometrics 
as a mainstream methodology; the number of applied empirical researchers who use 
econometric techniques in their work also indicates nearly exponential growth. We make 
two contributions to this literature. Firstly, positive spatial autocorrelation in empirical data 
appears far more frequent than negative spatial autocorrelation, and researchers tend to 
consider negative autocorrelation less relevant. If a particular variable increases (decreases) 
in one area, it also tends to increase (decrease) in neighboring areas. However, Griffith and 
Arbia (2010) offer three examples of negatively spatially autocorrelated phenomena, all 
based on the notion of competitive locational processes. If the manifestation of a certain 
phenomenon in one area occurs at the expense of its neighboring areas, then negative spatial 
autocorrelation is likely. We investigate whether universities compete and thereby 
contribute to the less explored area related to negative spatial autocorrelation. Secondly, 
since spatial econometric techniques mainly have been used to explain lattice or areal 
data (e.g., rectangles, zip codes, municipalities, regions, states, jurisdictions, countries), it 
is interesting to see that these techniques can also be used to analyze geo-referenced point 
data, particularly in this paper on the level of universities. The literature on hedonic 
models explaining housing prices is another research area using geo-referenced point data 
and spatial econometric techniques,
2
 but there are two differences. We use data on all 
universities within the study area and not only a selection of units that are just for sale 
within the observation period. Consequently, the spatial weights matrix covers all units 
within the population. Second, just as previous studies they focus on positive rather than 
negative spatial autocorrelation.  
 We begin our paper by introducing a spatial econometric model, which allows us 
to operationalize the spatial interaction effects empirically. We then outline our database 
of research publications and academic career details for academic economists employed 
at universities or research institutes in Austria, Germany, and German-speaking 
                                                 
 
2
 One of the first studies in this field is from Can (1990). 
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Switzerland and we define underlying measure of research productivity and present its 
spatial distribution across our study area in Section 3. After surveying the potential 
determinants of research productivity in Section 4; Section 5 reviews and discusses the 
results of our empirical analysis, focusing on the sign and significance of the spatial 
interaction parameter as our main evidence of research competition. Consecutively, we 
provide comprehensive set of robustness checks in Section 6. We conclude this article 
with a summary and discussion of the main results in Section 7. 
 
2. Spatial econometric modeling of competition 
Generally, three different types of interaction effects in a spatial econometric model can 
be distinguished: endogenous interaction effects among the dependent variable (y), 
exogenous interaction effects among the independent variables (x), and interaction effects 
among the error term (ε). Since we do not want to exclude any type of interaction effect 
in advance, a spatial econometric model with a full set of interaction effects is taken as 
point of departure. At the same time, we use the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria 
(AIC and BIC) to avoid potentially insignificant spatial interaction effects in the 
empirical analysis. These criteria improve when adding interaction effects to the model, 
but also include a penalty function which increases with the number of estimated 
parameters to discourage overfitting. Other spatial econometric studies also use these 
criteria as a mean to model selection, among which Le Gallo et al. (2003) and Battisti and 
Di Vaio (2008).  
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where yi is the dependent variable (e.g., research productivity in our study) for unit i (i = 
1, ..., N), α is the constant term parameter, xi is a 1×K vector of exogenous variables, and 
  is a matching K×1 vector of fixed but unknown parameters. Furthermore, εi and vi are 
error terms, the latter with mean 0 and variance σ2. The variable j jijyw  denotes the 
interaction effect of the dependent variable yi with the dependent variables yj in 
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neighboring units, the variables  j jijxw  with the independent variables xj in neighboring 
units, and  j jijw with the error terms εj in neighboring units, where wij is the i,j-th 
element of a pre-specified nonnegative N×N spatial weights matrix W that describes the 
spatial arrangement of the units in the sample.   denotes the spatial autoregressive 
coefficient, while , similar to , is a K  1 vector of parameters. If W is row-normalized, 
  is defined on the interval (1/rmin,1), where rmin equals the most negative purely real 
characteristic root of W (LeSage and Pace, 2009). 
 The matrix of partial derivatives of dependent variable in the different units with 
respect to the k
th
 explanatory variable in the different units (say, xik for i = 1, …, N) is  









































































for which we use the property that states the diagonal elements of W are 0 and the 
expected values of the error terms are zero. Following LeSage and Pace (2009), we can 
approximate the direct effect of the k
th
 explanatory variable by the average of the 
diagonal elements of the matrix [(I – δW)-1(βkI + θkW)] and the indirect effect by the 
average of the row (or column) sums of the non-diagonal elements of that matrix. The 
indirect effect measures the impact of changing an exogenous variable in a particular 
university on the research productivity of all other universities.  
 Of particular interest for this study are the coefficient estimate δ of the variable 
j jijyw  and the direct and indirect effects of size. In our study context, a negative value 
of   serves as an argument for competition among universities. That is, if a researcher 
working at a particular university publishes a journal paper, then  , together with the 
spatial weights matrix W, determines the number of (quality-adjusted) journal papers that 
researchers working at other universities can no longer realize, because the publication 
eliminates their potential primacy. A positive value of   instead would imply that the 
hypothesis that universities compete should be rejected, in favor of some productivity 
reinforcement. 
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If the direct effect of the size of economic departments is positive and significant, 
we can conclude that research output is subject to economies of scale. If in addition the 
indirect effect of the size of economic departments is positive and significant, cross-
fertilization with nearby universities takes place. Both outcomes would imply the 
existence of agglomeration economies. Equation (2) indicates that whether the direct and 
indirect effects of size are positive and significant depends on the signs, magnitudes, and 
significance levels of the underlying coefficients δ, βk, and θk, as well as on the 
magnitude of the elements of the spatial weights matrix W. Agglomeration economies 
thus may emerge even if universities are competitors, that is, if δ is negative.  
 
3. Economic research across German-speaking countries: Quantity and quality 
Our primary data source for the empirical analysis is a database of all individual 
researchers in economics, finance, and business administration currently affiliated with 
an Austrian, German, or German-speaking Swiss university or economic research 
institute. This “research monitoring” (Forschungsmonitoring3) database falls under the 
auspices of the German Economic Association
4
 and provides, for each researcher, all of 
his or her journal articles indexed in EconLit,
5
 as well as additional personal information, 
such as affiliation, current position, career length, and gender. Furthermore, it provides 
information about all coauthors (regardless of affiliation). The research monitoring 
database is updated annually, self-validated, and inclusive of new researchers. We use the 
December 2009 version. 
 For our analysis, we selected only researchers in economics who graduated earlier 
than 2008, to give time for the youngest scholars' publications to appear. Altogether we 
gather data about 1373 researchers affiliated with 81 universities and 17 research 
institutes: 80 are German (68 universities, 12 institutes), 12 Austrian (8 universities, 4 
institutes), and 6 Swiss (5 universities, 1 institute). The institutes include the research 
departments of the three national central banks and the European Central Bank in 
                                                 
 
3
 See www.forschungsmonitoring.org. 
4
 The German Economic Association (Verein für Socialpolitik) is the professional association for 
German-speaking economists (www.socialpolitik.org). 
5
 EconLit is the American Economic Association's electronic bibliography of economic literature 
(www.econlit.org). 
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Frankfurt. Economists affiliated with universities or research institutes with very small 
economic departments are excluded.
6
 
 To measure research productivity for the 98 research units in our sample, we 































y , (3) 
where yi denotes the i
th
 unit’s average research productivity over a particular period of 
time. We use the ten-year period, 2000–2009. The expression in square brackets is the 
average annual research productivity of researcher ri, where ri runs from 1 to Ni, which 
refers to the total number or researchers employed in research unit i. Researcher ri 
contributes to 
ir
P  research results (published journal articles) in the observation period, 
with a maximum length of 10 years (
ir
l  = 10). If a researcher ri’s academic career is 
shorter than 10 years, we adjust 
ir
l  accordingly. Note that for the youngest researchers, 
graduated in 2008, 
ir
l equals 1. Each publication 
ir
p  of researcher ri is weighted with a 
journal quality index 
ir
pq  and divided by the number of authors 
ir
pa of that publication. 
We use the journal quality index developed by Ritzberger (2008), who ranked 261 ISI
7
 
journals in economics and related fields on a scale from 1 (Econometrica) to 0 (19 
journals got a score of 0). In Section 6, we test whether our results are robust to 
alternative measures, including an alternative journal quality index, another measure of 
the importance of the publication, and a longer time period.  
 The average annual research productivity of the analyzed research units, 
according to our benchmark index, ranges from 0.000 to 0.167. The mean, calculated for 
all 98 research units, equals 0.028, and the standard deviation is 0.034. These results 
imply that an economist employed at a top institution produces the equivalent of one 
single-authored Econometrica article every six years or the equivalent of one single-
                                                 
 
6
 This criterion excludes 41 researchers working in 33 different organizations that included no 
more than 3 economists each. 
7
 Institute for Scientific Information. 
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authored article in a good journal such as the Journal of Public Economics (quality index 
0.171) annually. To produce the equivalent of one single-authored article in a good 
journal, the average economist employed at an ordinary university needs approximately 
six years. 
 Figure 1 features a map of staff size of the research units and their research 
productivity at the units’ various geographical locations. The left panel shows that the 
number of economists employed at the various locations corresponds to the regions’ 
populations, which likely reflects local demand for education. The right panel indicates 
that large universities do not necessarily produce more efficiently; some smaller units are 
highly productive (e.g., University of Basel), whereas some larger units’ productivity is 
well below average (e.g., University of Hamburg). Yet remote universities tend to be less 
productive than institutions in central cities. The financial centers of Germany and 
Austria, Frankfurt and Vienna, host each country’s most productive universities 
(Frankfurt University and University of Vienna) and institutes (European Central Bank 
and Institute for Advanced Studies). In Germany, other productive universities are mostly 
located in large cities in the west (e.g., Mannheim, Bonn, Cologne). Universities located 
in the east of that country exhibit lower levels of research productivity. The capital Berlin 
is an anomaly, mainly due to the Berlin Free University. In Austria, other than the 
University of Vienna, only the University of Innsbruck exhibits above-average research 
productivity. In German-speaking Switzerland, all universities and the Swiss National 
Bank have highly productive economics departments. 
<< Figure 1 about here >> 
 Other than Switzerland and the Frankfurt area though, we observe no obvious 
clustering, nor are the highly productive institutions distributed in any strikingly uniform 
manner across the three countries. A visual analysis thus cannot reveal whether the 
location of a research institution in relation to its neighbors affects the productivity of the 
researchers it employs. A formal test is needed to disentangle the potential effect of 





4. Explaining Research Productivity 
On the basis of previous research, we assess the non-spatial explanatory variables of 
research productivity. First, we control for lifecycle effects by including career age, 
which measures the number of years since the researcher received his or her doctoral 
degree. Several studies have found that the relationship between career age and research 
productivity is nonlinear, such that productivity tends to be high and increasing in the 
early years of a scientist’s career but then declines, eventually at a decelerating rate. The 
identification of the nonlinear relationship usually relies on the square of career age as a 
regressor (Maske et al., 2003), though some studies use higher-order polynomials (Kim et 
al., 2009; Rauber and Ursprung, 2008b). We therefore consider career age and its square. 
 Second, many studies include a gender variable (Fabel et al., 2008; Maske et al., 
2003; Rauber and Ursprung, 2008b; Taylor et al., 2006); depending on surrounding 
conditions, it appears that female economists publish less than male economists. Fabel et 
al. (2008) attribute this lower level of productivity to career interruptions (e.g., maternity 
leaves). Because significant gender effects emerge in previous studies with German data, 
we control for the share of female staff.  
 Third, we control for institutional characteristics. The size of the institution, 
measured as the number of researchers, provides a test for economies of scale. Fabel et al. 
(2008) find some evidence of positive but decreasing economies of scale, so we also 
include the square of this size measure. Research institutes differ from university 
departments, because their staff is not required to teach, and unsurprisingly, some studies 
reveal that teaching has a negative effect on research productivity (Fox, 1992; Taylor et 
al., 2006). However, research institutes also rely heavily on consulting, which may not 
transform easily into publications suitable for first-rate scientific journals. To control for 
these institutional differences, we include a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if 
the institution is a research institute.  
 Fourth, some studies control for the composition of the staff, which strongly 
influences the prevailing organizational culture (Cainelli et al., 2006; Fabel et al., 2008; 
Kim et al., 2009). Research activity by colleagues can generate positive spillovers 
through exchanges of expertise, ideas, and feedback on ongoing projects. According to 
Taylor et al. (2006), the presence of active peers should increase productivity, because it 
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enhances both formal and informal collaboration and may produce a competitive 
environment that encourages “keeping up” with colleagues. In contrast, in an academic 
environment in which nobody has published in (top) journals, a researcher may redirect 
his or her activities toward tasks that do not contribute to research production, according 
to our definition (Kim et al., 2009). Because research productivity generally is lower in 
institutions with a larger share of non-publishing members, we control for the share of 
researchers in each department who have never published an article in a journal indexed 
by Ritzberger (2008). Fabel et al. (2008) similarly capture this peer effect by including 
the share of junior members (assistant and associate professors) as an explanatory 
variable of average research productivity and find a significant negative effect. 
 Fifth, to determine whether the integration of a research unit into the science 
system affects research productivity, we include a variable that measures the number of 
scholars who have collaborated with coauthors outside their own research unit, as a 
fraction of all staff members who have published in journals indexed by Ritzberger 
(2008). Maske et al. (2003) and Taylor et al. (2006) find that the percentage of 
coauthored articles and average number of coauthors have positive and significant effects 
on research productivity.  
 Sixth, following Fabel et al. (2008), we allow for different intercepts in Germany, 
Austria, and Switzerland. We use Germany as a benchmark and add country dummies for 
Austria and Switzerland. These country fixed effects control for all country-specific, 
time-invariant variables whose omission could bias the parameter estimates, such as 
differences in the remuneration of university professors.  
  
5. Results 
Table 1 reports our estimates of the determinants of research productivity, based on the 
period 2000–2009 and 98 observations of university economics departments and 
institutes that conduct economic research. The first column shows the OLS estimator 
results applied to the log-linear functional form, without any spatial interaction effects. 
Whereas most studies adopt a linear relationship, Fox (1992) starts with a log-linear 
functional form to normalize the skewed distribution of productivity—few researchers 
produce many articles and many publish few or none. To test the linear and log-linear 
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functional forms, we first estimated the Box-Cox nonlinear regression model by ML with 
a common parameter γ for the research productivity dependent variable and the right-
hand side variables of career age and size. Dummies or variables measuring shares were 
not transformed. We find that γ = 0.182, with standard error of 0.142, indicating that the 
log-linear functional form is more appropriate. 
<< Table 1 about here >> 
 The second column of Table 1 contains the results of the general nesting spatial 
(GNS) model with a full set of interaction effects. The parameters are estimated by 
maximum likelihood (ML) and based on a row-normalized inverse distance matrix whose 
entries represent the Euclidian distances between each pair of research organizations. We 
derived these distances from GPS data reported by Google Earth and consider alternative 
specifications in the next section. Since the coefficients of all spatial interaction effects 
appear insignificant, probably due to overfitting the model, we used the Akaike and 
Bayesian information criteria (AIC and BIC) to reduce the number of interaction effects. 
We considered all different combinations that can be constructed out of the ten 
interaction effects in the GNS model (j jijyw , eight different  j jijxw  variables, and 
 j jijw ). A selection of the results is reported in Table 2. The combination that produces 
the lowest value of both AIC and BIC occurs when just one interaction effect is included, 
namely j jijyw corresponding to the spatial lag model. This result perfectly fits within the 
context of this study that states that scientists and the institutions for which they work are 
competitors. The spatial autoregressive coefficient in the latter model, whose results are 
reported in the third column of Table 1, equals -0.451 and is highly significant (t-value = 
-2.91). Therefore, if a researcher working at a particular organization publishes one 
additional journal article, the productivity of researchers working at other organizations 
falls on average by 0.34 journal articles.
8
 To be more precise: One article in 
Econometrica (quality weight = 1) might displace another article in Journal of Economic 
                                                 
 
8
 This coefficient is the average row (or column) sum of the non-diagonal elements of the matrix 
(I-δW)-1, with δ = -0.451 and W equal to the inverse distance matrix, based on Euclidian distances 
among research institutes. Also see the explanation we offer after Equation (2). 
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Theory (weight = 0.346), while a paper published in the latter journal might displace a 
paper in Economic Theory (weight = 0.118, or approximately 0.346 × 0.34).  
 In line with previous studies, the coefficients of the non-spatial explanatory 
variables in both the OLS and the spatial lag model have the expected signs. In addition, 
column 3(d) of Table 1 reports the results when research productivity depends on all our 
explanatory variables. Not every coefficient in this extended regression equation appears 
significant, so we dropped some variables from the model. We discuss these non-
significant variables in detail subsequently. 
<< Table 2 about here >> 
 The coefficient of the size of economic departments is positive and highly 
significant. This result corroborates the hypothesis that larger economic departments 
make their faculty more productive; peer pressure appears to generate economies of scale. 
Because research productivity and size are both measured as logs, the coefficient of the 
size variable represents an elasticity. The estimated coefficient of 0.46 can be interpreted 
as follows: Assume two research organizations at the same location, one of which is 
twice as large as the other. Economists working for the larger organization should be 46% 
more productive than peers employed by the smaller organization.  
 The square of the size variable has a negative coefficient, which indicates 
decreasing returns to scale. However, because the coefficient is insignificant, we drop this 
variable. To test for the agglomeration effect of nearby universities, we also estimated the 
model with the spatially lagged independent variable W × log size. The coefficient 
estimate of this variable is negative and insignificant (-0.124, t-value = -0.27); therefore, 
the size of neighboring research institutes, similar to the spatially lagged dependent 
variable of research productivity, reflects the competitive forces among scientists 
employed at different organizations. Because the coefficient was not positive and 
significant, we find no empirical evidence in favor of cross-fertilization effects across 
nearby universities. This result corroborates Bonaccorsi and Daraio's (2005) view that 
scientific excellence creates its own agglomeration effects rather than that agglomeration 
effects make researchers more productive, except for economies of scale. 
 The coefficient of the log of career age is negative and significant, consistent with 
the observation that productivity tends to be high in the first years of a career and 
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declines thereafter, such that younger departments are more productive. The coefficient 
of its square is positive; toward the very end of a person’s career productivity slightly 
increases again. However, this coefficient is insignificant, so we drop this variable. 
 Collaboration has a positive and highly significant effect on research productivity. 
This result reveals that collaboration is beneficial and that collaboration and competition 
generally coexist. According to the coefficient estimate and the average degree of 
collaboration in our sample, the decision to cooperate with coauthors employed by other 
organizations increases productivity by approximately 18%.
9
  
 The coefficient of the variable that measures the share of the researchers who do 
not publish is negative and significant. The presence of many inactive peers thus may 
induce colleagues to be less active as well. Alternatively, perhaps inactive colleagues 
create an academic environment that provides insufficient feedback, formal or informal 
collaboration, and/or exchanges of expertise and new ideas, which is not conducive to 
high research productivity. We also included a variable measuring the organizations’ 
share of junior staff and find a negative estimated coefficient, just as in Fabel et al. 
(2008), though it was not significant at conventional levels. We therefore exclude it. 
 The coefficient of the research institute dummy is negative and weakly significant 
(10% level), likely because the publication of articles in scientific (top) journals is not a 
primary task for research institutes, unlike for universities. The lower statistical 
significance might be explained by the high teaching loads of many university professors, 
which has a dampening effect on research productivity and results in rather small 
productivity differences in relation to research institutes. The coefficient of the gender 
dummy is negative but not significant (t-value = -0.72). The frequently identified 
negative impact of characteristic career patterns by female scientists is not apparent in our 
result, which may reflect the aggregate nature of our data.  
 Finally, the coefficient of the intercept dummy for Switzerland is positive and 
significant. Economists working at Swiss research organizations are slightly more 
                                                 
 
9
 The average university has 14.01 staff members, of whom 7.53 have published journal articles 
with coauthors outside their own university. If the latter number rises by 1 staff member, the 
collaboration variable increases from 0.54 to 0.61. Because its direct effect is 2.538, the log of 
research productivity increases by approximately (0.61 – 0.54) × 2.538 = 0.178, or 18%. 
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productive than their colleagues in Austria and Germany. Whether this outcome is a 
consequence of higher Swiss salaries and ensuing selection effects or of different 
institutional arrangements is unclear and deserves further inquiry. 
 Because we find that the spatial lag model is more appropriate than the OLS 
model, we identify the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables in the OLS 
model and the corresponding direct and indirect effects as biased. These effects follow 
from Equation (2) when the coefficient θk is set to 0.  
 Comparing the estimated direct effects of the OLS model with their counterparts 
in the spatial lag model, we observe noteworthy differences. In the spatial lag model, the 
direct effect of the dummy for Switzerland is 0.816; in the OLS model, it is 0.530. 
Therefore, the latter effect is underestimated by 35.0%. Similarly, the direct effect of 
career age is underestimated by 10.1%, that of size by 1.0%, and that of collaboration by 
6.3%. Conversely, the direct effect of the dummy variable for research institutes is 
overestimated by 33.3% and that of the share of non-publishing staff by 6.3%.  
 Whereas the indirect effects in the OLS model are set to 0, the t-statistics indicate 
that the indirect effects of size, career age, no top publishers, and collaboration differ 
significantly from 0. In other words, if one of the variables driving research productivity 
at the organization level changes, the result is a change in not only the research 
productivity of the economists employed by that organization but also the research 
productivity of neighboring organizations. The change at neighboring organizations 
moves in the opposite direction and is on an order of magnitude of approximately 31% of 
the original change. 
 
6. Robustness tests 
We now turn to whether our conclusions are sensitive to alternative model specifications. 
In spatial econometrics the proper choice of the spatial weight matrix plays an important 
role, given it is specified by analyst beliefs, rather than economic theory. In Table 3 we 
present five alternative specifications (1–5) of the spatial weights matrix, in addition to 
the inverse distance matrix based on Euclidian distances used thus far, as well as their 
underlying log-likelihood function values, Bayesian posterior model probabilities, and the 
parameter estimates of the residual variance (2). These alternative specifications cover a 
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wide range of spatial weights matrices from empirical research: p-order binary contiguity 
matrices (if p = 1, only first-order neighbors are included; if p = 2, the first- and second-
order neighbors are considered; and so on), distance matrices (linear or exponential 
distance decay functions, with or without a cut-off point), q-nearest neighbor matrices 
(where q is a positive integer), and block diagonal matrices in which each block 
represents a group of units that interact with one another but not with the units in other 
groups. 
 To obtain the log-likelihood values and residual variances, we estimate the spatial 
lag models by ML, and for the Bayesian posterior model probabilities (which sum to 1), 
we estimate the spatial lag models with the help of the Bayesian MCMC method.  
<< Table 3 about here >> 
 The first spatial weights matrix, labeled W-region, combines a binary contiguity 
matrix with a group interactions matrix. Its elements are 1 if two German organizations 
are located in the same state (Bundesland), and 0 otherwise.
10
 The W-4 is a four-nearest 
neighbor matrix, measured in terms of driving distances; it is the only matrix that is not 
symmetric. The W-distances ≤ 165 km combines an inverse distance matrix with a cut-
off point and a group interactions matrix, because every organization within 165 
kilometers is considered a neighbor, but not organizations beyond this cut-off point. The 
choice of the 165 km distance band prevents any organizations from lacking an 
interaction partner. In the next distance matrix, we include an exponential distance decay 
function (exp[-d]). All the matrices have been row-normalized, so the entries of each row 
add to 1. Finally, a last matrix assumes that all universities are neighbors and that the 
impact of each university is the same; all non-diagonal elements equal 1 before row-
normalizing and 1/(N – 1) afterwards. The idea underlying this equally weighted, single 
group interaction matrix is as follows: If researchers truly compete with one another, 
every researcher, regardless of his or her employer, is a competitor.  
                                                 
 
10
 Four city-states or small states merged with their immediate neighbors: Berlin with 
Brandenburg, Bremen with Lower Saxony, Hamburg with Schleswig-Holstein, and Saarland with 
Rhineland-Palatinate. Austria comprised two groups, Vienna and rest of the country. Switzerland 
and its six German-speaking research organizations represented one group. 
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Formally though, this spatial weight matrix should be rejected for reasons of 
consistency. Lee (2004) proves that any spatial weight matrix must satisfy one of the 
following two conditions: (1) the row and column sums of the matrix W before W is row 
normalized should be uniformly bounded by the absolute value as N approaches infinity, 
or (2) the row and column sums of W before row normalization should not approach 
infinity at a rate equal to or faster than the rate for the sample size N. Elhorst (2010) 
shows that the row and columns of the single group interactions matrix, before it is row 
normalized, are N –1 and that the rate at which these row and column sums approach 
infinity is the same as the rate at which the sample size N does. Therefore, this matrix 
satisfies neither condition, but by considering it, we test whether this matrix should be 
rejected empirically as well. 
 The results in Table 3 show that the inverse distance matrix based on Euclidian 
distances has the highest log-likelihood function value, the highest Bayesian posterior 
model probability, and the lowest parameter estimate for residual variance. The 
probability that this matrix is the most appropriate is approximately 1.9 times greater than 
the respective probabilities for its counterpart based on an exponential distance decay 
function, 2.1 times greater than that for the equally weighted group interaction matrix, 3.5 
times as large as that for the four-nearest neighbor matrix, 9.4 times as large as for the W-
region matrix, and more than 10 times greater than the W-distances ≤ 165 km matrix. In 
summary, spatial weights matrices with many zero non-diagonal elements underperform 
compared with spatial weights matrices with no zero non-diagonal elements, and the 
inverse distance matrix based on Euclidian distances is the best approximation of this 
latter group of matrices. This finding may reflect the labor market for scientists: 
Reputable universities always want to hire good researchers away from other universities 
to add their publications to their publication records. But just as the tendency to 
collaborate with other researchers decreases with distance, so does the willingness to 
relocate. That is, researchers appear willing to accept job offers from other universities if 
the remuneration exceeds their current salary plus the costs of relocation. Migration 
literature provides abundant evidence that these costs increase with distance. If instead of 
the inverse distance matrix, we were to adopt one of the other matrices, the competition 
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parameter remains negative, though in most cases, the significance level declines from 
5% to 10% (see the last two columns of Table 3). 
 In a second battery of tests, we checked whether our results in Table 1 are robust 
to alternative measures of research productivity (Table 4). Several studies include the 
number of pages of each article as an indicator of research significance, including 
Combes and Linnemer’s (2003) ranking of European economics departments, Rauber and 
Ursprung’s (2008a) ranking of economics departments in Germany, and Kim et al.’s 
(2009) investigation of research productivity in economics and finance departments at 25 
top U.S. universities. If we extend the productivity measure in Equation (5) to account for 
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where s denotes the number of pages of the article. Instead of using Ritzberger’s (2008) 
journal quality weights, we can use the quality weights that inform the popular research 
ranking of Austrian, German, and Swiss economics departments published by the 
business newspaper Handelsblatt. This journal list includes more than 1,200 journals, 
compared with the 261 journals rated by Ritzberger (2008).
11
 Furthermore, Handelsblatt 
considers only seven different quality levels: 1, 0.6, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1, 0.15, and 0.05. Thus the 
Handelsblatt weights are more evenly distributed than the quality weights proposed by 
Ritzberger. Although the use of quality weights is perhaps the most controversial item in 
productivity measures, Krapf (2011) shows that the ranking of economic research 
departments across different weighting schemes (including Ritzberger’s and the 
Handelsblatt version) are very robust.  
 As a third robustness check, we considered the length of the sample period. To 
provide perspective on the ten-year period (2000–2009) for our benchmark regressions, 
we investigated a sample covering 40 years (1970–2009). The Ritzberger (2008) and 
Handelsblatt journal quality weights refer to the more recent past, so we used weights 
                                                 
 
11
See http://tool.handelsblatt.com/tabelle/?id=33. In this robustness check we used the HB 2007 weights. 
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proposed by Laband and Piette (1994) for the first two decades (1970–1989) and those 
proposed by Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) for the 1990–1999 period.12 
 In the fourth robustness check, we allowed for heteroskedastic disturbances by 
specifying σ2j=α1+α2ni, where ni is the size of the economics department measured in 
number of people. The parameter estimates of α are both significant, but not reported in 
Table 4. 
 In the fifth robustness check, we estimated the spatial lag based on individual 
observations to test whether our results does not suffer from the ecological fallacy 
problem. University-level behavior analyzed with aggregated data may not correspond to 
individual level behavior. However, since some explanatory variables are measured at the 
university level, also known as contextual variables (institute, log size, no top publishers 
and collaboration), their standard errors will be downwardly biased, provided that 
researchers employed at the same university, just as these contextual variables, share 
unobservable characteristics as part of the error terms. See Moulton (1990) who 
highlighted this issue, and demonstrated that estimating aggregated data is one remedy to 
this problem. Conversely, an analysis based on individual data should account for 
interaction effects among researchers employed within the same university, otherwise the 
spatial autocorrelation coefficient will be upwardly biased assuming that this interaction 
effect is positive. This is a topic of ongoing research.   
 In the sixth robustness check, we limited the analysis solely to university 
departments to investigate the strength of competition accounting only for academic 
research. University professors and junior professors are able to raise research grants to 
finance researchers, mainly doctoral students and post docs, as well as material expenses, 
which are usually a rather minor part of the budget in economics research projects. It is 
important to notice that the principal investigator cannot raise funds to augment his or her 
salary. Nevertheless this kind of funding may have a positive effect on the research 
                                                 
 
12
 Laband and Piette (1994) rank 92 economic research journals according to impact-adjusted 
citations over the period 1975–79 and 130 journals over the period 1985–89. We used these 
rankings accordingly to weight the papers in our data set from 1970–79 and 1980–89, 
respectively. For 1990–99, we used Kalaitzidakis et al.’s (2003) ranking of 159 journals; they 
repeat Laband and Piette's (1994) analysis for 1994–98. For the last decade, we used the 
Ritzberger (2008) ranking again. 
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productivity of these professors and consequently of their departments. In Germany the 
share of so called third-party funding to overall inflows amounts to about 11% for 
humanities
13
. About a third of these third-party inflows are financed by the German 
Research Foundation (DFG), the largest research funding organization in Germany 
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 2009). The Austrian Science Fund (FWF) and Swiss 
National Science Foundation (SNF) are its Austrian and Swiss counterparts. Based on 
information from these three largest national foundations, we constructed a new variable, 
funding, which we included in the model specification for universities only. This variable 
is the sum of granted projects over the period 2005-2007 to each of the economic 
departments divided by the number of professors and junior professors.
14
 The coefficient 
of this funding variable turned out to be positive but insignificant. Similar weak evidence 
of research grants to scientific productivity was also revealed by other studies (e.g. Jacob 
and Lefgren, 2007). Of importance to our analysis is that it also did not affect the spatial 
autoregressive coefficient. One of the possible explanations is that the revealed 
competition in research productivity already includes the competition for grants; given 
that there are limited sources of government funding. Furthermore, it is more likely that 
grants are awarded to the best researchers/universities rather than that grants are provided 
to help less productive researchers to become more productive. 
<< Table 4 about here >> 
 The results in columns 2–5 of Table 4 show that the size of the spatial 
autoregressive coefficient and its significance level remain largely unchanged when we 
include the number of journal pages as an indicator of productivity, carry out the analysis 
for the period 1970–2009, allow for heteroskedasticity, or estimate the model for 
university departments only. As expected, the coefficient somewhat decreases due to 
positive internal interaction effects when the analysis is carried out on individual 
observations. However, it remains significant.
15
 In contrast, we obtain an insignificant but 
                                                 
 
13
 The real share for economics is not known, as this statistic is only available for four broad research 
groups: humanities (which economics is part of), life sciences, natural sciences and technical sciences.  
14
 Unfortunately, we were not able to collect data for the whole decade (i.e. 2000-09). Furthermore, we had 
to exclude two private universities in Germany because their research funding is on commercial basis.  
15
 The coefficient estimates are in line with those of spatial lag model based on aggregated data. The t-
values are generally higher, but note the Moulton bias discussed in main text. 
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still negative value when we use the Handelsblatt journal quality weights. The finding 
that competition is weaker according to the Handelsblatt weights indicates that scientific 
competition mainly motivates top performers; journeymen scientists appear motivated by 
other factors. To substantiate this hypothesis, we estimate a so-called biparametric spatial 
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where wij is the i,j-th element of the inverse distance matrix based on Euclidian distances 
(i.e., the best choice), and vij is the i,j-th element of the same spatial weights matrix 
limited to m top research units. In this setup, δ1 measures the competition effect among 
all research units, and δ2 measure it among only the top units. If our hypothesis is true, δ1 
will equal 0 and δ2 will be less than 0. To determine the number of top units, we estimate 
the model for different values of m (m = 5 to 93) and select that model for which the 
difference between δ1 and δ2 is significant and the log-likelihood function achieves its 
maximum. Column (8) in Table 4 contains the results with the Ritzberger weights, and 
column (9) features those for the Handelsblatt weights. These results confirm that the 
whole sample of research organizations can be subdivided into a group of top performers, 
who operate in strong competitive environments, and another group of weaker 
performers. The group of top performers includes 44 research units, with a spatial 
autoregressive coefficient of -0.617 (t-value = -4.10) with the Ritzberger weights; when 
we use the Handelsblatt weights, we include 20 research institutes with a spatial 
autoregressive coefficient of –0.334 (t-value = -2.85) in the top performers group. The 
latter finding corroborates the view that scientific competition exists even if we measure 
research productivity with Handelsblatt weights. 
 The impact of the intercept dummy for Switzerland appears most pronounced in 
the analysis for the longer period but smaller with the Handelsblatt weights. The 
coefficient of the dummy for research institutes, which was negative and weakly 
significant when we used Ritzberger’s weights, appears negative and weakly significant 
when we include the number of journal pages. However, the coefficient becomes 
insignificant if we conduct the analysis for the 1970–2009 period. The impact of the 
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dummy for research institutes almost completely disappears with the Handelsblatt 
weights—likely because top research traditionally has been written mainly at universities.  
 The coefficient of the size variable is positive and highly significant in all model 
specifications. Because the interval for this coefficient appears rather small (0.350 to 
0.568), this finding reconfirms the existence of economies of scale. The negative 
coefficient of career age is significant in all model specifications. However, the age effect 
grows most pronounced when we include the number of journal pages and least when 
using the Handelsblatt weights.  
 The coefficient of the no top publishers variable is negative and significant in 
most model specifications. For the period 1970–2009 and considering only university 
departments, the impact of “sleepers” becomes more pronounced. This rather plausible 
result reflects that scientific competition was less global in the past, so local factors 
played a larger role. As for the research institutes, we posit that their staff is less 
susceptible to peer group effects because of the traditionally strong leadership by institute 
managers. The opposite result emerges for collaboration though. The estimated 
coefficient of this variable is substantially smaller for 1970–2009 than for the benchmark 
period, regardless of the model specification. This result indicates that networking and 
collaboration among researchers have become much more important in the recent past.  
 Finally, the coefficient of the gender dummy is sizable, negative, and significant 
for the 40-year period. This finding may offer evidence that modern female scientists are 
better able combine their family lives with their academic aspirations. 
 
7. Conclusions 
We provide strong empirical evidence in favor of Merton's (1973) basic notion that 
scientists are engaged in competition. If a researcher working at a particular university 
publishes a journal paper, the number of (quality-adjusted) journal papers that researchers 
working at other universities can realize decreases, as a result of that focal publication. 
The extent of the effect depends on the specification of the spatial weights matrix, the 
method of measuring research productivity, and the sample setup. Using Bayesian 
posterior model probabilities, maximum likelihood function values, and estimates of the 
residual variance, we find that a spatial weights matrix without zero non-diagonal 
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elements best describes the data; an inverse distance matrix based on Euclidian distances 
offers the best approximation of that spatial weights matrix. This finding is consistent 
with the notion that the willingness to relocate decreases with distance. 
 With this matrix, we find that the negative and significant competition effect 
ranges from -0.216 to -0.671 when we (1) use (top) Ritzberger weights, (2) consider 
journal page productivity rather than just article productivity, (3) use Handelsblatt 
weights instead Ritzberger weights, though only in the biparametric spatial autoregressive 
model in this latter case, (4) allow for heteroskedasticity, (5) carry out the analysis on 
individual rather than aggregated data, (6) conduct the analysis over a period of four 
decades (1970–2009) rather than only the past decade (2000–2009), and (7) investigate 
universities only rather than both universities and research institutes. 
 The most important control variables for research productivity are the size of 
economic departments, career age, the share of non-publishing staff, and the degree of 
collaboration. Larger economic departments make their faculty more productive because 
they offer economies of scale. Research productivity tends to be higher for younger 
research units and declines for older units, in concordance with lifecycle theories of 
research productivity. The greater the share of staff that does not publish, the more 
journal-targeted research of active colleagues will be redirected to other activities too, 
which causes research productivity to fall disproportionally. Even when researchers are 
competitors, their collaboration with coauthors outside their own university pays off, on 
average by 18%. 
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Table 1. Explaining log research productivity using different model specifications  
 (1) (2) (3) 
    (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Determinants OLS General nesting model Spatial lag model 














 (-2.38)   (-3.67)   (-1.08) 
Austria 0.220 0.060 -0.209 0.111 0.124 -0.037 0.383 
 (0.74) (0.13) (-0.26) (0.40) (0.43) (-0.38) (1.05) 




 -0.273 0.797 
  (1.27) (1.52) (0.15) (2.00) (2.00) (-1.58) (1.99) 
Institute -0.724
**



















 (3.06) (2.80) (-0.26) (3.24) (3.34) (-2.41) (0.69) 
Log
2
 size       -0.051 
       (-0.26) 
W×Log size       -0.124 
       (-0.27) 











    (-3.14) (-3.07) (0.05) (-3.70) (-3.77) (2.49) (-0.81) 
Log
2
 career age       0.103 
            (0.24) 
Junior professor       -0.894 
          (-1.09) 













    (-3.11) (-3.00) (0.48) (-2.97) (-3.02) (2.28) (-2.81) 
Female -0.756 -0.395 -2.244 -0.607 -0.610 0.183 -0.517 














 (3.22) (3.42) (0.09) (3.63) (3.73) (-2.58) (3.73) 
δ (+λ in GNS)   δ=-0.366 λ=-0.296 δ=-0.451**   δ=-0.450** 
  (-1.38) (-0.878) (-2.91)   (-2.70) 
R
2
  0.649 0.654  0.645   0.647 
Log Likelihood  -173.90 -121.14  -122.35   -121.66 
**
 Significant at 5%. 
*
 Significant at 10%.  
Notes: The spatial weights matrix is an inverse distance matrix based on Euclidian distances. T-values are in parentheses; 
LM statistics are based on OLS residuals, and LR statistics are based on log-likelihood function values. 
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Table 3. Determination of most significant spatial interaction effects based on AIC and BIC criterions 
Interaction effect None    W* Y W * ε 
 AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC 
None -0.0089 0.2284 -0.1611 0.1026 -0.1401 0.1237 
W * Austria  0.0194 0.2832 -0.1410 0.1491 -0.1238 0.1664 
W * Switzerland  0.0205 0.2843 -0.1406 0.1495 -0.1242 0.1659 
W * Institute  0.0204 0.2842 -0.1521 0.1380 -0.1195 0.1706 
W * Log size  0.0153 0.2791 -0.1402 0.1499 -0.1437 0.1464 
W * Log career age  0.0227 0.2865 -0.1557 0.1345 -0.1320 0.1581 
W * No top publishers  0.0103 0.2741 -0.1394 0.1508 -0.1603 0.1298 
W * Female  0.0209 0.2847 -0.1407 0.1494 -0.1453 0.1449 
W * Collaboration  0.0191 0.2829 -0.1464 0.1437 -0.1462 0.1437 
Notes: AIC=ln(σ2)+(2K)/N, BIC= ln(σ2)+[Klog(N)]/N, with K the number of explanatory variables and N the number of 
observations. AIC=-0.1576 and BIC=0.1326 for model with both W*Y and W*ε. Results for models with more than two 




Table 3. Spatial weight model, comparison with spatial lag model 
 



















(1) W-region (0/1) -123.52 0.043 0.053 0.746 -0.236 -1.66 
(2) W-4 nearest neighbors (0/1) -123.26 0.115 0.141 0.719 -0.240 -1.87 
(3) W-driving distances < 165 km (0/1) -123.87 0.038 0.047 0.759 -0.236 -1.64 
(4) W- Euclidian distances (exp[-d]) -123.75 0.211 0.260 0.694 -0.528 -1.70 
(5) W-single group interactions (1/(N-1)) -124.19 0.188 -* 0.723 -0.306 -0.65 
(6) W- Euclidian distances (1/d) -122.35 0.406 0.500 0.694 -0.451 -2.91 




Table 4. Variants of the spatial lag model from Table 1  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 





















































































































































































































































































































  0.645 0.642 0.740 0.683 0.697 0.570 0.683 0.669 0.761 
Observations 98 98 98 98 1373 98 81 98 (m=44) 98 (m=20) 
§ Results reported in Table 1: article productivity, Ritzberger weights, period 2000–2009, universities plus research institutes. 
ŧ Biparametric spatial lag model for top and other research units, based on Ritzberger or Handelsblatt weights. 
**
 Significant at 5%. 
*
 Significant at 10% (not indicated in column 5) 






























Figure 1: Geographical distribution of research units in the study data sets 
Each circle represents one of the 98 research units. The size of a circle indicate the relative size (left) or relative research productivity 
(right) of a unit. Productivity (right) is calculated according to 2000–2009 publications weighted by Ritzberger’s (2008) journal 
weights. 
